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Medical Malpractice Reform and Physicians in
High-Risk Specialties
Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann

ABSTRACT

If medical malpractice reform affects the supply of physicians, the effects will be concentrated
in specialties facing high liability exposure. Many doctors are likely to be indifferent regarding
reform, because their likelihood of being sued is low. This difference can be exploited to
isolate the causal effect of medical malpractice reform on the supply of doctors in high-risk
specialties, by using doctors in low-risk specialties as a contemporaneous within-state control
group. Using this triple-differences design to control for unobserved effects that correlate
with the passage of medical malpractice reform, we show that only caps on noneconomic
damages have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the per capita number of doctors and that
this effect is concentrated among only those specialties that face the highest litigation
exposure.

1. INTRODUCTION

The American Medical Association (AMA) and other supporters of medical malpractice reform assert that, in the face of rising liability premiums, many doctors are forced to cut back on the services that they
offer, retire before they had planned, or move to states that enact tort
reform. Opponents of reform, however, point to studies suggesting that
there is little correlation between liability payments and premiums to
debunk the reformers’ claims. They also note that studies of doctors’
location decisions imply that the effect of medical malpractice reform
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on physicians’ location decisions is modest at best (see, for example,
Baker 2005, ch. 7).
In this paper, we revisit the physician location issue and argue that
existing studies do not fully exploit the available experiment offered by
state reforms. Speciﬁcally, because only the subset of physicians practicing in high-risk specialties are likely to be affected by a medical malpractice crisis, physicians in low-risk specialties represent a contemporaneous within-state comparison group. By exploiting this control group,
we can net out unobservable effects that correlate with medical malpractice reforms but that are not adequately captured by time-invariant
state ﬁxed effects or generic year effects. Most signiﬁcant, existing studies
have had difﬁculty ruling out the possibility that medical malpractice
reforms are endogenous to forces that correlate with physician supply,
such as the political clout of doctors as a group or state preferences for
medical services. To the extent that these forces are correlated with the
total supply of doctors in a state and not just the subset of physicians
in high-risk specialties, using physicians in low-risk specialties as a control group will mitigate the potential for simultaneity bias.
Employing a triple-differences identiﬁcation strategy in which physicians in high-liability specialties in states that pass medical malpractice
reform serve as the treatment group and physicians in low-liability specialties in those same states serve as the contemporaneous control group,
we ﬁnd that only caps on noneconomic damages have a large and statistically signiﬁcant effect on doctors’ location decisions and that the
effect is concentrated entirely in those specialties that face the most
exposure to medical malpractice liability.
These results suggest that medical malpractice reform can generate
large increases in the supply of medical services in a state. However, not
all the commonly proposed reforms are justiﬁed on this basis, and the
effects appear to be limited to only a subset of physicians. Thus, it may
make sense to focus reform efforts on noneconomic damage caps and
to tailor them to apply only to certain specialties. Our paper represents
the only attempt in the literature to distinguish the effects of different
kinds of medical malpractice reforms.
In Section 2 of this paper, we review the existing evidence on the
relationship between medical malpractice reform and physician location.
We then describe our identiﬁcation strategy and the data that we examined in Section 3, while presenting results in Section 4. Section 5
discusses the policy implications of our results, and the conclusion follows in Section 6.
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2 . P R E V I O U S S T U D I E S O F R E F O R M A N D P H Y S I C I A N S U P P LY

Klick and Stratmann (2005) was the ﬁrst study to examine the effects
of individual reforms on the labor supply of physicians. In that paper,
we found that the only reforms with consistent statistically signiﬁcant
effects on doctors’ location decisions are caps on noneconomic damages
and the establishment of victims’ funds. We also found that caps lead
to a 2 percent increase in the number of doctors per capita, whereas
victims’ funds lead to a decline in the number of doctors of almost 4
percent. In an attempt to control for the endogeneity of reform, we
implemented an instrumental variables technique, ﬁnding that only the
effect of noneconomic damage caps survived after controlling for endogeneity.
Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) collapsed medical malpractice reforms into two categories: direct (reforms that directly affect how much
a defendant will have to pay in the event of a judgment) and indirect
(limitations on whom/when a plaintiff can sue). In a difference-indifference regression framework, they found that direct reforms increase
physician supply by about 3 percent and that the effect is concentrated
among physicians in high-risk specialties.
Encinosa and Hellinger (2005) used county-level data to examine the
effect of caps on noneconomic damage awards on physician supply. They
found that adoption of caps leads to an increase in physician supply of
2 percent in general and of more than 3 percent in rural counties. In a
longer time series, Matsa (2007) also examined the effect of damage
caps on county physician labor supply and found that caps increase the
supply of specialists in rural areas by more than 10 percent. These results
are basically consistent with those of Baicker and Chandra (2004), who
found that increases in liability costs lead to statistically signiﬁcant reductions in the supply of physicians in rural counties.
Dranove and Gron (2005) examined the labor supply of individual
physicians in Florida and found that neurosurgeons signiﬁcantly cut back
the volume of brain surgeries that they perform when medical malpractice premiums rise. They found no similar effect for obstetricians.
This somewhat conﬂicts with the indirect results on physician supply
described by Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (2001), who found that
expectant mothers have greater access to prenatal care when liability
exposure is low.
Helland and Showalter (2006), using an approach similar to the one
we implement here, examined the intensive margin of physician labor
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supply. They found that damage caps induce physicians to work more
hours in a year, and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant. In addition,
similar to our results, they found that the effect is most pronounced in
those specialties facing the most liability exposure.
Taking a different approach, Mello et al. (2004) surveyed specialists
in Pennsylvania and found that their professional satisfaction is negatively related to liability exposure. This is consistent with their later
results (Mello et al. 2005) that suggest that Pennsylvania specialists have
scaled back their practices and are more likely to retire early as a result
of liability exposure. Their results also indicate that this has led to a
reduction in access to care for patients in Pennsylvania.
Although most of these studies point in a similar direction (that is,
at least some medical malpractice reforms increase physician supply in
at least some underserved communities), all suffer from potential endogeneity, with the exception of Helland and Showalter (2006). That
is, if states tend to pass reforms when doctors are particularly numerous
(and, therefore, politically powerful) or when state residents have a particularly high demand for medical services, the positive relationship between reform and physician supply is biased upward. Although Klick
and Stratmann (2005) made some improvements in this direction by
using instrumental variables analysis, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd strong instruments for multiple reforms, especially when reforms tend to be passed
in packages.1 Thus, the existing literature provides relatively little conﬁdence in the causal effect of reforms on physician supply.2

3 . D ATA A N D I D E N T I F I C AT I O N S T R AT E G Y

We examine physician location using AMA data on the number of doctors in each specialty in each state for the years 1980–2001.3 To deﬁne
1. In Klick and Stratmann (2005), our approach endogenized some reforms (that is,
those that appear to be important in ordinary least squares regressions) through instrumental variables techniques, while including the other reforms as endogenous regressors.
However, if the other reforms are important in determining physician location, as well as
being endogenous and correlated with the instrumented reforms, omitting them or including
them directly in the regression will bias the estimated effects of the instrumented reforms.
2. Another possible form of simultaneity arises if states pass reforms only when they
are in a crisis because doctors have exited the state. If this is the case, estimated coefﬁcients
will be biased toward zero.
3. American Medical Association, AMA Physician Masterﬁle (American Medical Association, 515 North State Street, Chicago, IL 60610). Data are not available for 1984
and 1990, so those years are omitted from our data set.

M A L P R A C T I C E R E F O R M A N D H I G H - R I S K S P E C I A LT I E S /

S125

our treatment and comparison groups, using the Florida Closed Claims
Medical Malpractice data set,4 we identify the 10 specialties exhibiting
the highest average medical malpractice awards per doctor and the 10
specialties with the lowest average awards.5 Our dependent variable is
the natural log of the number of doctors in each of these specialties in
each state per 100,000 state residents.6
For physicians in low-risk specialties to serve as an adequate control,
this group must satisfy two criteria. First, the unobservable factors driving physicians’ location decisions within each of these groups must be
highly correlated. If this is not the case, the control group does nothing
to mitigate the endogeneity concerns described above. Second, the location decisions of physicians in low-risk specialties must be mostly
unaffected by medical malpractice reforms.
With regard to the ﬁrst criterion, we provide evidence in Table A1
that the number of physicians in low-risk specialties per capita is a
positive predictor of the number of physicians in high-risk specialties
per capita in three separate speciﬁcations: speciﬁcation (1) controls for
just a constant and the low-risk-specialty variable, speciﬁcation (2) adds
state and year ﬁxed effects to speciﬁcation (1), and speciﬁcation (3) adds
state-speciﬁc linear trends to speciﬁcation (2). In each case, with robust
or state-clustered standard errors, the effects are highly statistically signiﬁcant, generating p-values less than .0005. Further, this single predictor
explains a large portion of the variation in the number of physicians in
high-risk specialties per capita, generating an R2-value of .761 in speciﬁcation (1).
The assumption that physicians in low-risk specialties are unaffected
by medical malpractice reforms would likely be proved false if insurers
pool risk for physicians in high- and low-risk specialties. If this is the
case, our estimates of the effects of medical malpractice reforms on the
4. Florida Medical Malpractice Closed Claims (Florida Department of Financial Services, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399). See Helland, Klick, and Tabarrok
(2005) for a description of this data set.
5. Specialties with the most claims awarded are (in decreasing order) neurological
surgery, thoracic surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, general practice, emergency room,
plastic surgery, radiology, anesthesiology, general surgery, and cardiovascular disease. Specialties with the fewest claims awarded are (in increasing order) diabetes, neoplastic diseases, oncology, public health, psychiatry, allergy, rheumatology, physical medicine, dermatology, and nephrology.
6. Use of the natural log to remove the scale effects in the data is potentially important
given the fairly large differences in the number of doctors in each specialty. If we instead
use the level as our dependent variable, the results in terms of sign and statistical signiﬁcance
are mostly unchanged, although the magnitudes of the treatment effects differ.
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location decisions of physicians in high-risk specialties will be biased
toward zero. However, this possibility seems remote for the speciﬁc specialties in our control group. Since the physicians in these specialties are
very rarely sued, any attempt to pool their risk with that of physicians
in specialties exposed to medium to high litigation risk should induce
separation, since physicians in these low-risk specialties either drop coverage or seek insurers covering only physicians in low-risk specialties.7
We examine the effects of those reforms that constitute the AMA’s
legislative priorities:8 caps on noneconomic damages, collateral source
reform, joint and several liability reform, caps on attorney contingency
fees, and mandatory periodic payment of future damages. We also include caps on total medical malpractice damages and the creation of
no-fault victims’ compensation funds, since these reforms have been
identiﬁed by other groups as being particularly important for the specialties of primary interest, especially obstetrics. Data for these reforms
come from the American Tort Reform Association.9
Although most existing studies do not examine reforms separately or
focus on only noneconomic damage caps, this approach has the potential
to lead to omitted variable biases. Speciﬁcally, since reforms tend to be
passed in packages, the passage of noneconomic damage caps is correlated with the passage of other reforms. If the other reforms affect
physicians’ location decisions, the estimated effect of noneconomic damage caps will be biased. Further, the Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005)
approach of grouping reforms as direct and indirect is potentially problematic if some reforms have a negative effect on doctors’ location decisions.10 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
For comparison purposes, we present the results of a simple difference-in-difference model of the effect of tort reforms on physicians in
7. For example, the American Psychiatric Association endorses an insurance plan that
restricts coverage to psychiatrists only (see The Psychiatrists’ Program, Professional Liability Insurance Designed for Psychiatrists [http://www.psychprogram.com/psychpro.htm]).
Psychiatrists have the ﬁfth lowest liability exposure by our measure.
8. These reforms are identiﬁed at American Medical Association, AMA Agenda: Advocacy Efforts (http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7861.html).
9. American Tort Reform Association, Medical Liability Reform (http://www.atra
.org/issues/index.php?issuep7338).
10. In theory, joint and several liability reform could lead to a negative effect on
doctors’ location decisions if doctors favor the partial liability shield offered by joint and
several liability as plaintiffs go after the deeper pockets of hospitals or other doctors. Also,
no-fault victims’ funds could generate this effect because they are funded by a tax on
doctors. Klick and Stratmann (2005) found some evidence of the negative effects of these
reforms, although the effects are not uniformly statistically signiﬁcant.

Number of doctors in a given specialty and a given state per 100,000 residents
Number of doctors in the most-sued specialties in a given state per 100,000
residents
Number of doctors in the least-sued specialties in a given state per 100,000
residents
One if state has enacted a cap on noneconomic damages and specialty is a high
litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has enacted a cap on total medical malpractice damages and
specialty is a high litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has overturned common-law collateral source rule in medical
malpractice cases and specialty is a high litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has restricted joint and several liability in medical malpractice
cases and specialty is a high litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has restricted contingency fees for lawyers in medical malpractice
cases and specialty is a high litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has given judges the discretion to mandate payment of judgments
through annuities in medical malpractice cases and specialty is a high
litigation risk; zero otherwise
One if state has established a no-fault compensation fund for medical
malpractice victims and specialty is high risk; zero otherwise

Description

.108

.218

.186

.173

.237

.042

.121

.108

.218

.186

.173

.237

.042

.121

1.977

3.348

10 High-Risk
Specialties
4.085
6.194

Mean

4.672
5.996

Five High-Risk
Specialties

Sources. Data on doctors are from American Medical Association, AMA Physician Masterﬁle (American Medical Association, 515 North State Street,
Chicago, IL 60610), and cover the period 1980–2001 (with 1984 and 1990 missing owing to the AMA’s failure to collect data in those years). Data on
medical malpractice reform are from American Tort Reform Association, Medical Liability Reform (http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issuep7338).

Victims’ Fund

Periodic Payment

Contingency

Joint and Several

Collateral Source

Total Damage Caps

Noneconomic Damage Caps

DoctorsLow

Doctors
DoctorsHigh

Variable

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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Table 2. Difference-in-Difference Estimator: Medical Malpractice Reforms and the Location
of Physicians in High-Risk Specialties

Noneconomic Damage Caps

Total Damage Caps

Collateral Source

Joint and Several

Contingency

Periodic Payment

Victims’ Fund

State # specialty-speciﬁc
trends
Observations
Adjusted R2

Five Highest-Risk
Specialties

10 Highest-Risk
Specialties

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.029
(.011)
[.034]
.005
(.022)
[.057]
.033
(.010)
[.025]
⫺.056
(.012)
[.021]
⫺.002
(.015)
[.024]
.004
(.010)
[.017]
⫺.040
(.017)
[.048]

.012
(.009)
[.013]
.022
(.015)
[.011]
.015
(.009)
[.017]
⫺.009
(.012)
[.011]
⫺.017
(.012)
[.017]
⫺.000
(.008)
[.015]
⫺.006
(.014)
[.011]

.013
(.006)
[.025]
.028
(.012)
[.044]
.027
(.006)
[.022]
⫺.045
(.007)
[.021]
.007
(.008)
[.021]
⫺.008
(.006)
[.016]
⫺.030
(.009)
[.035]

.008
(.005)
[.008]
.027
(.008)
[.006]
.005
(.005)
[.010]
⫺.006
(.006)
[.006]
⫺.010
(.006)
[.009]
⫺.000
(.004)
[.009]
⫺.009
(.008)
[.010]

No
4,799
.988

Yes
4,799
.994

No
9,644
.990

Yes
9,644
.996

Note. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of doctors in a given
specialty per 100,000 state residents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets. Regressions for the ﬁve highest-risk
specialties examined the number of doctors in each specialty (per 100,000 state residents)
for the following specialties: neurological surgery, thoracic surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, general practice, and emergency room. Regressions for the 10 highest-risk specialties
added the following specialties: plastic surgery, radiology, anesthesiology, general surgery,
and cardiovascular disease. All regressions were estimated with state population weights
and include specialty # year and state # specialty effects.

high-risk specialties in Table 2, using the natural log of the number of
doctors per 100,000 state residents in each state’s specialty group for
high-risk specialties only. We ﬁnd that no reform has a consistently
statistically signiﬁcant effect on doctors’ location decisions across speciﬁcations, with or without state and specialty-speciﬁc trends. However,

M A L P R A C T I C E R E F O R M A N D H I G H - R I S K S P E C I A LT I E S /

S129

given the potential for endogeneity, these estimated effects are likely to
be biased.
For our triple-differences analysis, we examine the natural log of the
number of doctors per 100,000 state residents in each state and specialty
group for both the high- and low-risk specialties (as described above),
using separate year dummies for each specialty (t) , separate ﬁxed effects
for each specialty in each state (l) , and separate year dummies for each
state (J) to control for any time-varying effects within each state. In
addition, in these speciﬁcations, the REFORM vector only matches the
medical malpractice reforms with the observations for the high-risk specialties in cells with state by year interactions in which the reforms are
in place. The regression takes the following form:
ln (Doctorsist) p b # REFORM ist ⫹ tit ⫹ l is ⫹ Jst ,
where i is specialty, s is state, and t is year. For the triple-differences
analysis, we also present a speciﬁcation that adds separate linear trends
for each state and specialty combination as a robustness check.
All regressions are estimated with the appropriate state population
weights.11 We present robust standard errors and standard errors clustered by state to mitigate the concerns about serial correlation in
difference-in-difference analyses raised by Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004).12

4 . R E S U LT S

The results from the triple-differences model are presented in Table 3.
We ﬁnd that only noneconomic damage caps have a consistently statistically signiﬁcant effect on the number of doctors per capita in high-risk
specialties who are practicing in a state. When only doctors in the ﬁve
specialties with the highest litigation exposure are considered, noneconomic damage caps are associated with an increase of 6.6 percent
(p p .000) when state and specialty trends are not included and of 6.1
percent (p p .000) when the trends are included. The statistical significance holds when standard errors are clustered at the state level (p p
11. The results are mostly unchanged if we use a more complicated weighting scheme
that recognizes the fraction each specialty contributes to the overall physician pool on
average.
12. The results are also robust to estimating Newey-West standard errors when the
lag structure is chosen optimally, as suggested in Stock and Watson (2003).

Table 3. Triple-Differences Estimator: Medical Malpractice Reforms and the Location of
Physicians in High-Risk Specialties

Five Highest-Risk
Specialties

Noneconomic Damage Caps

Total Damage Caps

Collateral Source

Joint and Several

Contingency

Periodic Payment

Victims’ Fund

State # specialty-speciﬁc
trends
Observations
Adjusted R2

10 Highest-Risk
Specialties

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.066
(.016)
[.031]
.016
(.031)
[.048]
.023
(.014)
[.023]
⫺.012
(.013)
[.026]
⫺.014
(.017)
[.030]
⫺.021
(.014)
[.023]
.032
(.022)
[.036]

.061
(.015)
[.023]
.016
(.031)
[.034]
.017
(.014)
[.026]
⫺.001
(.014)
[.026]
⫺.028
(.016)
[.027]
⫺.008
(.014)
[.023]
⫺.013
(.022)
[.034]

.039
(.012)
[.026]
⫺.007
(.026)
[.021]
.013
(.010)
[.018]
.004
(.010)
[.024]
.008
(.013)
[.018]
.019
(.011)
[.016]
⫺.017
(.015)
[.035]

.041
(.011)
[.013]
.007
(.023)
[.019]
⫺.016
(.010)
[.014]
.012
(.008)
[.014]
⫺.013
(.011)
[.023]
.012
(.010)
[.014]
⫺.014
(.016)
[.030]

No
9,380
.991

Yes
9,380
.994

No
18,065
.992

Yes
18,065
.995

Note. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of doctors in a given
specialty per 100,000 state residents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets. Regressions for the ﬁve highest-risk
specialties examined the number of doctors in each specialty (per 100,000 state residents)
for the following specialties: neurological surgery, thoracic surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, general practice, and emergency room. Regressions for the 10 highest-risk specialties
added the following specialties: plastic surgery, radiology, anesthesiology, general surgery,
and cardiovascular disease. For the within-state control groups, the following low-risk
specialties were used in the regressions for the ﬁve highest-risk specialties: diabetes, neoplastic diseases, oncology, public health, and psychiatry. For the regressions for the 10
highest-risk specialties, the following additional low-risk specialties were used for the
within-state control groups: allergy, rheumatology, physical medicine, dermatology, and
nephrology. All regressions were estimated with state population weights and include specialty # year and state # specialty effects.
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.039 and .010, respectively). None of the other reforms has a statistically
signiﬁcant effect, and the joint effect of the other reforms is not statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation.
Interestingly, when we examine the 10 specialties with the greatest
liability exposure, the relative effect of the reform is diminished, even
though the effect of noneconomic damage caps is still positive and generally statistically signiﬁcant. When state and specialty trends are not
included, noneconomic damage caps are associated with an increase of
only 3.9 percent (p p .002; p p .138 with clustered standard errors).
Including the trends increases the effect to 4.1 percent (p p .000; p p
.002 with clustered standard errors). These effects are only about 60
percent as large as those estimated for the ﬁve specialties with the most
liability exposure. This suggests that virtually all of the effect of noneconomic damage caps is concentrated in those ﬁve specialties.
Interestingly, if we compare the effects estimated in Table 3 with the
Table 2 results, we ﬁnd that the effect of noneconomic damage caps
estimated in the triple-differences model is more than two times as large
as that estimated in the difference-in-difference model in every speciﬁcation, and the difference between the coefﬁcients is statistically significant. This implies that noneconomic damage caps most often may be
systematically passed in crisis situations when the number of physicians
in high-risk specialties has declined. Note that this underestimate of the
effect of noneconomic damage caps in the difference-in-difference model
occurs even in the speciﬁcations that include linear trends. This ﬁnding
undercuts the claim in Matsa (2007) that including trend indicators
before the caps’ passage mitigates the possibility that passage is endogenous to the number of doctors in a state.
In Table 4, we present regressions that drop all the reforms except
the noneconomic damage caps. The estimates of the effect of noneconomic damage caps are substantially the same as those generated in the
model including all the reforms. This suggests that previous studies that
focused solely on noneconomic damage caps did not suffer from a bias
resulting from the omission of other reforms. Although this is consistent
with Matsa’s (2007) results from speciﬁcations in which he included a
general medical malpractice reform control for the presence of any other
reform in the state (and the coefﬁcient of the variable for noneconomic
damage caps did not change), the results presented here provide a more
general robustness check regarding the claim that failure to control for
other reforms does not generate an omitted variables bias in the estimated effect of noneconomic damage caps. Speciﬁcally, our Table 3
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Table 4. Triple-Differences Estimator: Noneconomic Damage Caps and the Location of
Physicians in High-Risk Specialties

Five Highest-Risk
Specialties
(1)
Noneconomic Damage Caps

State # specialty-speciﬁc
trends
Observations
Adjusted R2

.066
(.015)
[.028]
No
9,380
.991

(2)
.057
(.014)
[.021]
Yes
9,380
.994

10 Highest-Risk
Specialties
(3)
.046
(.011)
[.027]
No
18,065
.992

(4)
.042
(.010)
[.014]
Yes
18,065
.995

Note. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of doctors in a given
specialty per 100,000 state residents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets. Regressions for the ﬁve highest-risk
specialties examined the number of doctors in each specialty (per 100,000 state residents)
for the following specialties: neurological surgery, thoracic surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, general practice, and emergency room. Regressions for the 10 highest-risk specialties
added the following specialties: plastic surgery, radiology, anesthesiology, general surgery,
and cardiovascular disease. For the within-state control groups, the following low-risk
specialties were used in the regressions for the ﬁve highest-risk specialties: diabetes, neoplastic diseases, oncology, public health, and psychiatry. For the regressions for the 10
highest-risk specialties, the following additional low-risk specialties were used for the
within-state control groups: allergy, rheumatology, physical medicine, dermatology, and
nephrology. All regressions were estimated with state population weights and include specialty # year, state # specialty, and state # year effects.

results allow the various other reforms to generate effects that have
differences in sign and size.
Our results suggest that only caps on noneconomic damages have a
robust, positive, and statistically signiﬁcant effect on the location decisions of physicians in high-risk specialties. Unfortunately, given the nature of the data available to examine this question on a comprehensive
scale, we cannot isolate the source of this effect—that is, we are not
able to determine whether the effect is due to specialists switching the
location of their practice mid-career, beginning their practice in states
with more favorable tort regimes, delaying their retirement in states with
reforms, or some combination of the three. The AMA data do not allow
us to determine the relative contributions of these mechanisms, and we
are not aware of any nationally comprehensive state-level data set tracking initial licensing decisions or retirement decisions by specialty.
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5 . D O E S I T M AT T E R ?

The preceding results suggest that noneconomic damage caps are effective in increasing the per capita number of doctors in the highest-risk
specialties. In fact, if we borrow a calculation from Kessler, Sage, and
Becker (2005), it would take a 22 percent increase in doctors’ wages to
generate a supply response comparable to the response generated by the
passage of a cap on noneconomic damages.13 Furthermore, since this
result represents only the effect on the extensive (entry/exit) margin, it
is likely to be the lower bound of the true total effect of caps, given
Helland and Showalter’s (2006) results regarding the intensive (hours
worked) margin.
However, as argued in Klick and Stratmann (2005), it is not clear
that this increase in supply will generate improvements in public health.
The health improvements resulting from increased access need to be
balanced against any harm that is likely to result from the decrease in
the incentive for a doctor to provide optimal care.
To examine this potential trade-off, we investigate the effect of medical malpractice reform on infant mortality rates. This health metric
seems particularly appropriate to examine in this context, since obstetricians are often the focus of the medical malpractice reform movement.
Infant mortality also is potentially affected by both access to care14 and
quality of care.15
Because of evidence of racial discrepancies in infant mortality rates
(Leslie et al. 2003), we examine white and black infant mortality rates
separately. We include a host of covariates in addition to medical malpractice reforms. We include controls for personal income per capita in
the state, a measure of the percentage of the state population with a
secondary education, the percentage of the state population without
insurance, per capita governmental transfer payments, medical-speciﬁc
13. Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) use estimates from Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994)
that suggest that a 1 percent increase in physician wages leads to a .3 percent increase in
hours worked by a physician.
14. For example, Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (2001) found that decreasing liability costs are associated with improved access to prenatal care, especially among black
women. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2006) reports that babies
born to women who did not receive prenatal care are three times more likely to exhibit
low birth weights and ﬁve times more likely to die than are babies born to women who
received prenatal care.
15. For example, Papworth and Cartlidge (2005) report that half of all instances of
perinatal asphyxia during the period 1994–95 in the United Kingdom were the result of
suboptimal care.

S134 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 6 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 0 7

transfer payments, and per capita alcohol sales because of the direct
negative effect of drinking on pregnancy and as a general proxy for
wellness in a state. We also include the percentage of the state population
aged 15–19 years, because young mothers experience more difﬁcult pregnancies (Phipps, Sowers, and DeMonner 2002). We add a measure of
the abortion rate to control for the possibility that abortion might be a
way to prevent postbirth mortality (see Gruber, Levine, and Staiger
1999). Finally, we include the percentage of the state population that is
black for the infant mortality regressions for both the white and black
populations, because there is some evidence that areas with large minority populations tend to have poor health care resources (Satel and
Klick 2005; Klick and Satel 2006). Descriptive statistics are presented
in Table 5.
We examine infant mortality rates in a standard difference-indifference format including time-invariant state ﬁxed effects and year
effects that are common to all states. In some speciﬁcations, we include
state-speciﬁc trends as well. Table 6 presents results from these regressions.
The only medical malpractice reform that has a consistently statistically signiﬁcant effect on infant mortality is collateral source reform.
For black infant mortality rates, collateral source reform is associated
with an increase in mortality, regardless of whether state-speciﬁc trends
are included. The effect represents an increase of between 5 and 7 percent
in the black infant mortality rate.
Although this may seem surprising, Baker (2001) suggests that collateral source reform is particularly important in the medical malpractice
context, since many cases are not brought by plaintiffs’ attorneys if the
recovery of medical bills is not possible. The deleterious public health
effects of collateral source reform are identiﬁed in other research as well
(Rubin and Shepherd 2007). If this indeed is the driving factor leading
to the collateral-source-reform-induced infant mortality effect that we
observe among blacks, then it might be surprising that we do not observe
a positive relationship between collateral source reform and physician
location, since collateral source reform presumably would make practice
in a given state cheaper. However, we do ﬁnd this effect for only the
black infant mortality rate, which implies that the beneﬁts of this reform
may be nontrivial for doctors working in low-margin areas. If that is
the case, we might not expect to see a large (or precise) effect on the
overall number of specialists in a state that passes collateral source reform.

Description

635.30
.42
.27
.50
.46
.48
.49
.40
.05
.01
.08
2.53
.39
.15
.69
.12
19.34

945.05
.22
.08
.45
.29
.36
.42
.20
.17
.07
.76
13.98
1.73
.25
2.51
.11
23.34

S.D.
123.97

Mean
427.44

Source

ATRA
ATRA
ATRA
ATRA
ATRA
ATRA
ATRA
CPS
Census
Census
BEA, BLS
BEA, BLS
BEA, BLS
NIH
Census
AGI

CDC

CDC

Sources. CDC p Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Compressed Mortality File (http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd9.html); ATRA p American Tort
Reform Association, Medical Liability Reform (http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issuep7338); CPS p U.S. Census Bureau (1980–98a); Census p U.S.
Census Bureau (1980–98b); BEA p Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Annual Personal Income (http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi); BLS p Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Consumer Price Indexes (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm); NIH p National Institutes of Health, Per Capita Ethanol Consumption for States,
Census Regions, and the United States, 1970–2005 (http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/Resources/DatabaseResources/QuickFacts/AlcoholSales/consum03.htm);
AGI p Guttmacher Institute (2003).
Note. CPI p consumer price index.

White 6-Day Infant Mortality Rate Number of deaths of white infants occurring during the ﬁrst 6 days after birth, per
100,000 white infant births
Black 6-Day Infant Mortality Rate Number of deaths of black infants occurring during the ﬁrst 6 days after birth, per
100,000 black infant births
Noneconomic Damage Caps
One if state has passed a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases
Total Damage Caps
One if state has passed a cap on total medical malpractice damages
Collateral Source
One if state has abolished the collateral source rule
Joint and Several
One if state has abolished joint and several liability
Contingency
One if state has adopted limitations on fees charged by plaintiff’s attorney
Periodic Payment
One if state has mandated periodic payments of judgments
Victims’ Fund
One if state has established a victims’ compensation fund
Uninsured
Percentage of state population with no insurance
Percent 15–19
Percentage of state population between the ages of 15 and 19 years
Secondary Education
Percentage of state population with a high school education
Income
Personal income (in $1,000s), deﬂated by the CPI
Transfers
Per capita governmental transfer payments, deﬂated by the CPI
Medical Transfers
Per capita medical transfer payments, deﬂated by the CPI
Alcohol
Alcohol sales (in gallons of ethanol) per person aged 14 years or older
Percent Black
Percentage of state population that is black
Abortion Rate
Number of legal abortions performed in state per 1,000 women aged 15–44 years

Variable

Table 5. Infant Mortality Descriptive Statistics

Table 6. Effect of Medical Malpractice Reforms on 6-Day Infant Mortality Rate per 100,000
Births

White Infant
Mortality Rate

Noneconomic
Damage Caps

Total Damage Caps

Collateral Source

Joint and Several

Contingency

Periodic Payment

Victims’ Fund

Uninsured

Percent 15–19

Secondary Education

Income

Transfers

Medical Transfers

Alcohol

Black Infant
Mortality Rate

(2)

(3)

(2)

(3)

5.873
(5.269)
[5.422]
7.948
(13.294)
[10.437]
7.077
(5.466)
[7.055]
14.018
(4.461)
[5.458]
⫺11.084
(7.310)
[7.958]
⫺1.483
(6.336)
[6.236]
⫺13.612
(7.915)
[9.370]
⫺82.405
(73.759)
[77.037]
223.757
(566.490)
[728.673]
⫺438.250
(114.950)
[122.726]
⫺5.773
(3.447)
[4.033]
⫺36.495
(26.886)
[35.922]
⫺65.544
(54.134)
[68.463]
41.226
(14.901)
[14.640]

2.889
(6.374)
[7.621]
⫺4.634
(17.549)
[8.927]
13.751
(7.117)
[10.970]
9.425
(5.444)
[5.934]
⫺13.431
(8.310)
[11.487]
1.502
(7.205)
[7.608]
17.439
(13.012)
[17.737]
⫺.858
(82.939)
[97.271]
232.225
(957.377)
[1,180.186]
⫺17.762
(289.203)
[406.437]
.533
(4.143)
[4.976]
⫺11.906
(42.895)
[49.769]
⫺66.828
(66.759)
[88.804]
12.346
(21.605)
[20.852]

⫺55.441
(23.309)
[44.443]
24.018
(44.851)
[35.684]
44.441
(19.457)
[21.985]
24.480
(17.833)
[23.304]
⫺68.555
(29.301)
[29.687]
⫺19.526
(25.100)
[23.173]
11.619
(25.883)
[42.935]
⫺44.229
(274.372)
[310.084]
5,872.344
(2,740.692)
[4,136.524]
575.411
(492.907)
[653.015]
27.971
(13.475)
[17.619]
119.079
(104.650)
[179.941]
⫺391.532
(222.229)
[309.039]
⫺15.909
(55.842)
[57.164]

⫺5.743
(26.236)
[35.306]
⫺48.308
(56.138)
[28.436]
72.519
(25.531)
[32.192]
16.581
(22.147)
[27.668]
⫺18.433
(31.333)
[26.123]
9.730
(31.263)
[30.753]
⫺4.308
(38.693)
[48.015]
151.000
(294.669)
[383.602]
5,959.739
(3,768.993)
[6,283.222]
1,114.040
(885.073)
[1,170.268]
21.317
(17.067)
[24.885]
147.150
(179.212)
[206.337]
⫺129.690
(294.290)
[230.405]
26.323
(79.820)
[91.491]
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Table 6. continued

White Infant
Mortality Rate

Percent Black

Abortion Rate

State-speciﬁc trends
Adjusted R2

Black Infant
Mortality Rate

(2)

(3)

(2)

(3)

191.301
(469.984)
[721.435]
⫺.031
(.666)
[.889]
No
.906

1088.560
(1,063.028)
[1,632.726]
⫺.007
(.774)
[.979]
Yes
.926

500.888
(1,483.678)
[2,310.627]
⫺2.601
(2.373)
[2.810]
No
.758

5,434.686
(2,894.703)
[2,340.840]
⫺1.163
(2.898)
[3.642]
Yes
.814

Note: The regressions were estimated with the appropriate population weights and include
state and year effects. The dependent variable is the number of infants of each race who
died within 6 days of birth, per 100,000 births. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets. The time period analyzed is
1980–98.

Although the results are not robust across speciﬁcations, both noneconomic damage caps and contingency reform appear to improve the
black infant mortality rate substantially, although both effects are statistically signiﬁcant only in the speciﬁcations that do not include statespeciﬁc trends. Noneconomic damage caps lower the black infant mortality rate by about 6 percent. This may imply that, by attracting doctors
to underserved areas, noneconomic damage caps improve access to
health care for black mothers. This would be consistent with the ﬁndings
of Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (2001), who also observed this effect
among black mothers. Contingency fee restrictions are associated with
a 7 percent reduction in the black infant mortality rate. For the white
infant mortality rate, only the abolition of joint and several liability
appears to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect of raising the infant mortality rate, but the effect is small and is not robust to the inclusion of
state-speciﬁc trends.
Results on accidental deaths provided by Rubin and Shepherd (2007)
also are consistent with the notion that, whereas some medical malpractice reforms improve public health, others can prove to be deleterious. Speciﬁcally, they found that collateral source reform is associated
with an increase in the accidental death rate, whereas most of the other
reforms that they examined improve accidental death rates. Although
they do not separate medical malpractice reforms from other kinds of
tort reforms, it is plausible that most of the effect that they identify
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works through changes in physician labor supply and behavior as a result
of medical malpractice reform.16
Results by Kessler and McClellan (1996) suggest that medical malpractice reform can lead to a savings in resources, if not necessarily an
improvement in public health, because doctors are less likely to engage
in defensive medicine when they are shielded from liability. In other
words, in a high-liability environment, doctors have the incentive to
engage in wasteful testing and procedures that do not improve a patient’s
health but that do provide cover in the event that litigation arises over
a random adverse health event.
The effect of medical malpractice reform on public health is generally
an open question that deserves much further research. At a minimum,
the results provided here with respect to infant mortality (a health metric
that would seem to be most directly related to much of the discussion
of medical malpractice reform) suggest that reform in general might not
have universally positive or negative effects and that many individual
reforms may have no effect at all. However, this conclusion is driven
more by a lack of precision in the estimates than by an estimate of the
precisely zero effect of reforms, which suggests great value in reexamining this general topic with other health metrics that might allow for
more precise estimates of the effects of medical malpractice reforms.

6. CONCLUSION

The fear of losing physicians has induced many states to adopt medical
malpractice reforms. However, most existing estimates of the relationship between medical malpractice reform and physician labor supply
suggest that the effects are modest. Furthermore, there is a concern that
the correlation is the result of endogeneity, since the passage of reforms
may be related to unobserved factors that also correlate with the size
of the physician workforce in a state.
This paper exploits the fact that only physicians in specialties that
face high liability exposure are likely to be affected by medical malpractice reforms, while other physicians are likely to be indifferent to
16. Rubin and Shepherd (2007) also suggest that some of the effect arises from improved incentives for consumers to buy safer products when tort reform implicitly lowers
the prices of new products. This effect is likely to be more attenuated than the effect of
medical malpractice reform, since it will be difﬁcult for national suppliers to enforce differential prices across states given the arbitrage opportunities that this creates for consumers
and resellers.
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reforms in their location choice. We estimate a triple-differences model,
using physicians in low-risk specialties as a contemporaneous withinstate control group, to net out any time-varying state effects that coincidentally correlate with the adoption of reforms and physician labor
supply in a state. We ﬁnd that the adoption of caps on noneconomic
damages has a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on the location
decisions of doctors in high-risk specialties. This effect is robust and
appears to be causal. Furthermore, our results provide greater conﬁdence
in a causal interpretation than do studies that treat the passage of reforms
as exogenous, as well as studies that do not control for the various kinds
of reforms that are passed.
It is not clear what the net effect of increasing the physician labor
supply through tort reform is on public health. Improved access is presumed to improve welfare, but there may be offsetting effects as doctors
face reduced incentives to provide optimal care when medical malpractice reforms are adopted. We examined the effect of individual medical
malpractice reforms on infant mortality and found mixed results for the
effect of reform on this public health metric.
If increasing the supply of physicians in high-risk specialties is a goal
of policymakers, the results presented here suggest that a targeted approach to medical malpractice reform may be warranted. Speciﬁcally,
not all the reforms advanced by advocates will increase physician supply.
Also, it may be optimal to tailor the reforms so that they apply only to
especially sensitive specialties, such as surgery and obstetrics. Previous
research also suggests that reforms might best be tailored to apply to
only doctors practicing in particularly underserved areas, such as rural
counties or minority communities. Broad-based medical malpractice reform that goes beyond noneconomic damage caps and that applies to
all physicians regardless of specialty and location, however, will not
affect most doctors’ supply decisions and could prove deleterious to
public health on other margins.
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APPENDIX

Table A1. Relationship between High- and Low-Risk Specialties in Three Regression
Speciﬁcations

ln(DoctorsLow)

State effects
Year effects
State # specialty-speciﬁc trends
Adjusted R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

.335
(.006)
[.021]
No
No
No
.761

.454
(.033)
[.111]
Yes
Yes
No
.951

.167
(.025)
[.042]
Yes
Yes
Yes
.989

Note. The dependent variable is the natural log of the total number of doctors in
high-risk specialties per 100,000 state residents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and standard errors clustered by state are in square brackets. The high-riskspecialty variable (DoctorsHigh) is the total number of doctors (per 100,000 state residents) in the following specialties: neurological surgery, thoracic surgery, obstetrics
and gynecology, general practice, emergency room, plastic surgery, radiology, anesthesiology, general surgery, and cardiovascular disease. The low-risk-specialty variable
(DoctorsLow) is the total number of doctors (per 100,000 state residents) in the following
specialties: diabetes, neoplastic diseases, oncology, public health, psychiatry, allergy,
rheumatology, physical medicine, dermatology, and nephrology. All regressions were
estimated with state population weights. N p 969 observations.
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